Like many great inventions, the idea behind F-Response is so simple and elegant it is hard not to punish yourself for not thinking of it. Using the iSCSI protocol to provide read-only mounting of remote devices opens up a wealth of options for those of us working in geographically dispersed environments. I have used it for everything from remote imaging to fast forensic triage to live memory analysis. F-Response is vendor-neutral and tool independent, essentially opening up a network pipe to remote devices and allowing the freedom of using nearly any tool in your kit. The product is so good, I really wouldn’t blame them for just sitting back and counting their money. Luckily, counting money gets boring fast, so instead the folks at F-Response have kept innovating and adding value. Their latest additions are new “Connector” tools: Database, Cloud, and Email.
Packers are most commonly used for compression, code obfuscation, and malware anti-reversing. While not always malicious, packers are often a clue to look a little deeper into a particular binary. Ange Albertini did a marvelous job of representing the (known) universe of executable packers in this infographic.
The full PDF file can be found here.
Device acquisition may not be the sexiest phase of digital forensics, but it has the most number of pitfalls and can result in catastrophic loss. If a practitioner makes a mistake during acquisition, the investigation may simply be over, with nothing left to examine. Establishing an acquisition process is important, and a critical part of your process should be checking for the presence of full disk and volume-based encryption. Disk encryption is more prevalent than many believe –I am anecdotally seeing it in use on nearly thirty percent of the computers I encounter. If a system is running, the examiner often has a one-time shot to capture any mounted volumes in their decrypted state.
The inherent challenge is how to determine if an encrypted disk or volume exists. From the perspective of the operating system, data on a mounted volume is available in unencrypted form. A separate abstraction layer takes care of encrypting write operations and decrypting data for read operations. Thus when encountering a live system, investigators are often left with ad-hoc tests to try and make a determination. They can look for telltale installed software, or particular icons present on the system, but there are few reliable ways to get a confident answer whether encryption does or does not exist.
I recently had the opportunity to collaborate with the SANS Institute Securing the Human team as a guest editor for their OUCH! Security Awareness Newsletter. It was a rewarding experience working with such a competent and professional team. The theme of the September 2012 newsletter is “Hacked: Now What?”. While I am more used to writing technical articles, topics in OUCH! are written at a higher level and oriented towards the average computer user. It was fun to collaborate on topics relevant to this audience. The goal of the newsletter is to serve as a free resource that organizations of any size can use to increase the security awareness of their employees. Looking back through the archives, I think it consistently achieves this goal.
Harlan Carvey discusses the ramifications of Windows Registry anti-forensics on his blog: http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2012/08/setregtime.html.
You can find SetRegTime here: http://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/wiki/SetRegTime
While doing some browser forensics research, I stumbled upon a Chrome extension named Collusion for Chrome. This extension provides a visual representation of the tracking information shared with third party sites during web browsing . While the notion of browser tracking is hardly surprising these days, Collusion provides some of the most compelling evidence I have seen for the “Do Not Track” movement.
As an example, the image above shows my browser activity during a brief period. I selected a specific node corresponding to Wired.com and you can see the vast number of external connections a visit to Wired spawns. Information about the various contacted sites can be identified using the following key:
- Blue nodes: Sites previously visited by the user
- Gray nodes: Third party sites receiving browser data (never visited by user)
- Red nodes: Known aggregators of tracking information (the slash indicates the site was blocked by Collusion)
Mastering Windows Network Forensics and Investigations fills an interesting niche not well addressed in the pantheon of digital forensics resources. The material is well suited for beginning and intermediate forensic examiners looking to better understand network artifacts and go beyond single-system forensics. I highly recommend it for system administrators looking for a different perspective on network security or those interested in designing networks to be forensics-friendly. That said, the topics covered do not fit within the classical definition of network forensics. A more apt title might be Mastering Incident Response Forensics and Investigations.
This is the first book I have read in the Sybex Mastering series, and I was impressed with the writing, research, and editing. The authors blended dense material with relevant examples and insightful and engaging text boxes. Some of my favorite “side” topics were:
- “Cross-platform Forensic Artifacts”
- “Registry Research”, illustrating the use of Procmon for application footprinting
- “Time is of the Essence”, explaining fast forensics using event logs and the registry
The book begins with four chapters familiarizing the reader with Windows networking. While this may slow down those hungry for forensics topics, they are replete with information. Windows domains, hacking methodology, and Windows credentials are all described in these early chapters. Amazingly, this is the first forensics book I have read containing a discussion of the NTDS.DIT Active Directory database file, perhaps the most dangerous file in the enterprise. While there were probably too many pages spent on password sniffing and cracking, I recognize it is beneficial to understand the risks and I commend the authors for also mentioning pass the hash and token stealing attacks. It would have been valuable to see these same attacks identified later in the book via Windows registry and log artifacts. Continue Reading…